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THE EVOLUTION OF AGRICULTURAL PRICING POLICIES
IN ZIMBABWE - 1970’s AND 1980’s
by N. A. WRIGHT and T. TAKAVARASHA
The object of this paper is to discuss the development of 
agricultural pricing policies in Zimbabwe during the 1970’s and 
1980’s and to make special note of changes in policy formulation 
since independence in 1980. In approaching the topic the paper first gives an outline of the formal marketing system for
controlled agricultural commodities as it existed in 1970, and 
discusses the procedures and methods of price determination and 
the institutions involved. A brief description of state
intervention in agriculture and the main events that have 
influenced the direction of agricultural development prior to 
1970 follows. Finally the paper assesses the various policy 
objectives which have affected price levels, and the impact of 
price levels on marketed output of'state controlled commodities
during the 1970’s and 1980’s. Influences that are extraneous to
pricing which have affected agricultural production over the 
period are also examined in-so-far as they either enhanced or
negated the price policy objectives for individual commodities.
A agRimiUBALi MARKETING AM  PBIglijG IN 1970
i) The Single Channel Marketing System for Agriculture in 1970
Direct state intervention in marketing and pricing in agriculture 
had been in operation in Zimbabwe since the early 1930’s (see 
section B for a description of these interventions). By 1970 four 
statutory bodies, which were subsiduary to a fifth parastatal, had been constituted under seperate Acts of Parliament to operate 
single channel marketing systems for many agricultural products. 
The Agricultural Marketing Authority, formed in.1967, was tasked 
with the overall objective of advising its parent ministry (the 
Ministry of Agriculture), on the pricing and marketing of state 
controlled or regulated agricultural commodities. Its main 
functions were the formulation of overall marketing policy and 
finance raising for its subsiduary boards. Policy and pricing 
recommendations were derived through a system of advisory 
committees which included members from its parent ministry and 
producer organisations. The General Managers of each of the four 
marketing boards were responsible to the Authority.1 This system 
still operates in 1989.
The four subsiduary boards were the Grain Marketing Board (formed 
in 1931), the Cold Storage Commission (1937), the Dairy Marketing 
Board (1952), and the Cotton Marketing Board (1969).2 All of 
these Boards had degrees of monopsony or monopoly control over 
specific commodities (see section B for details of the 
commodities).3 For example the Grain Marketing Board had
monopsony purchasing controls over commodities for which it. was 
responsible in so-called Zone A areas (which includes all the 
commercial farm and main urban areas), and only a residual buying 
function in Zone B. areas (which includes all the communal farming
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areas). In the former areas commodity prices were prescribed by 
government and all grain and oilseed products not retained for 
on-farm use had to be sold through the Grain Marketing Board. 
Prices were not controlled within the Zone B areas, and communal 
farmers could either sell these products to consumers within 
their own communal areas at ruling free market prices or to the 
Grain Marketing Board at the current prescribed prices. The 
Cotton Marketing Board enjoyed a country-wide monopsony control 
over the purchase and sale of cotton. The other two agricultural 
marketing parastatals’ absolute monopoly powers were limited to 
exports and, subject to certain regulations, internal trade in 
cattle and milk could take place without parastatal involvement.4 
However both the Cold Storage Commission and Dairy Marketing 
Board effectively controlled prices on the domestic market for 
their respective products by virtue of their very substantial 
share of these markets. All the Boards were required to sell 
their commodities at prescribed prices on the domestic market and 
to best advantage on external markets.5 The guiding principle in 
carrying out their marketing functions was that these activities 
should financially result in a non profit - non loss trading 
result in the long term. This system of marketing controls has 
remained in force with some minor amendments since 1970.
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ii) Prices for Controlled Agricultural Products
Prices for Controlled crop commodities took the form of interim 
and final prices. In terms of the Grain Marketing Act, prescribed 
or "final" prices for summer crop commodities under its control had to be gazetted on or before the 1st May (later changed to 
July 1st) of each marketing intake year commencing on the 1st 
April of the same year (there was a provision for advance 
payments at levels set by the Minister to producers for. 
deliveries during April). The prescribed price for wheat had to 
be gazetted on or before the 1st October. Prices applicable 
during the period between the commencement of the marketing year 
and the date of the gazetting of final prices were “interim" 
prices which, almost invariably, were the prices that had applied 
in the previous marketing year (after 1975 "interim" prices 
consisted of preplanting prices). In price setting quality
factors were taken into account and price differentials existed 
for different grades of product delivered. If at any time during 
the intake period the Minister was of the opinion that because of, 
satisfactory marketing performance supplementary payments to 
producers were justified he could direct the Board to make these 
payments (after consultation at cabinet level). Similar
provisions concerning payments to producers existed in the 
Marketing Acts for the other Boards. However seasonal variations 
in price levels were built into the price schedules for livestock, 
commodities to cater for desired intake levels during the year 
and increased maintenance feeding costs during the dry season.
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iii) Institutional Pricing Procedures - 1970’s
The great importance, attached to the pricing of major state 
controlled agricultural commodities in the 1970’s was reflected
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icvci. uuwcvcr several insT>ix»ux*ion5 were invoivea in vne aecision 
making process up to this level. The pricing procedure began with 
in-house discussions by both the Agricultural Marketing Authority and the R.N.F.U.(now the C.F.U.). Prices would be discussed by 
the various committees of the Agricultural Marketing Authority 
from the standpoint of marketing performance and the effects of 
any price changes on the trading accounts of the marketing, 
boards. Similar fdiscussions would take place at the union with 
the focus on changes in costs of production. Several commodity 
associations representing large scale producers of specific 
commodities were affiliated to the union. Elected representatives 
of these associations and those of the union would discuss and 
decide on price recommendations to be made to the Agricultural 
Marketing Authority and to government.
Formal procedures began with meetings between producer 
representatives and the Agricultural Marketing Authority. 
Depending on - the outcome of these discussions and marketing 
performance shown in the trading accounts of the marketing 
parastatals decisions were then made by the Agricultural 
Marketing Authority on prices to recommend to the Ministry of 
Agriculture. Budgeted trading accounts based on these prices were 
prepared which reflected the anticipated financial performance of 
the marketing parastatals and any subsidies payments which may 
have been involved. These were forwarded to the Ministry of 
Agriculture together with written submissions justifying the 
price recommendations. This procedure was later followed by 
meetings between Agricultural Marketing Authority representatives 
and the Minister and senior officials of the Ministry of 
Agriculture to discuss the recommendations.
Following meetings with the Agricultural Marketing Authority the 
commodity associations of the R.N.F.U. would submit written 
proposals on prices to the Ministry of Agriculture for their 
perusal, prior to meetings held between producer representatives 
and the Minister of Agriculture and his senior officials. The 
submissions would include detailed schedules of production costs 
which would demonstrate the effects on the economic viability of 
producing a particular commodity of any input price changes that 
had occured. At the meetings producers were given the opportunity 
to put forward their views on pricing policy and price levels. 
These meetings took place at different times of the year 
depending on the marketing board intake periods for particular 
commodities, and (after 1976) whether preplanting prices or final prices were being considered.
After the series of meetings with marketing and producer 
representatives internal meetings within the Ministry of 
Agriculture were held where the Minister of Agriculture and his 
senior officials would decide on prices to recommend to cabinet. 
The responsibility for setting price -levels lay with the Minister 
who was guided by his officials. Unlike in the immediate post 
second world war Period when deficit production levels prevailed 
for the major controlled products and a costs plus profit margin
technique was used to set; price ±eve±s in tne xaru Sj. However 
several interrelated factors were considered when setting prices. 
These factors werea) current and anticipated production levels. Crop production 
information from the crop forecasting committee of the Central 
Statistical Office was used for crop commodities. Information 
from surveys conducted by the Central Statistical Office was used 
for livestock commodities.
b) onfarm costs of production were an important consideration iriassessing the economic viability of producing particular 
commodities. Schedules of costs were produced by the Economics 
and Markets Branch of the Ministry of Agriculture and the Economics Branch of the Union. Great reliance was placed on farm management data collected from commercial farms in surveys
conducted by the Farm Management Research Section of the Ministry towards the end of the 1960’s and during the first half of the 
1970’s. However by 1977 the war had taken its toll on the number
of farmers willing to cooperate and the collated data from those
remaining on the recording scheme were unreliable as indicators 
of economic Viability. Thereafter "model" costs for each 
commodity, based on input levels necessary to achieve an expected 
yield in normal rainfall conditions, were used to assess
production viability.
c) marketing board trading performance. In assessing the impact 
of producer price changes on the trading accounts of the relevant 
marketing marketing board several factors had to be considered. 
These included :-
*- both current and anticipated intake levels
- carried forward stock levels
- the volume of domestic and export sales
- export markets and the likely level of. realisations from each
type of market \ :
- foreign exchange earning priorities and possible subsidies . , 
arising from depressed world prices (if applicable)
- for some commodities the volume and cost of imports
- consumer prices (which was the responsibility of they 
Ministry of Trade and Commerce)
- the strategic value of maintaining production of a 
particular commodity and its contribution to the welfare 
of the farming sector and to that of the country
- board handling costs- cheap food .policies and the level of possible subsidies .y 
arising from these policies
- intercommodity price relationships (eg. being an input 
into the livestock industries maize price levels directly, 
affected the viability of livestock production).
Estimates of many of these items were reflected in the trading 
account budgets for the, following year. . y-
Each factor was weighted according to the type, of commodity being 
considered. Anticipated export realisations had a greater bearing 
on price levels for commodities which were largely exported 
(eg.cotton) than other factors. On the other hand strategic 
stockpiles, envisaged production, domestic consumption
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for maize were usually more important than possible export 
realisations when determining prices for this commodity. Due. 
consideration would be given to all facets important to each case and a price recommendation derived for each commodity. A paper with supporting data would be prepared and forwarded to the 
M.E.C.C. working party (which was a cdmmittee consisting of senior officials of the economic ministries and chaired by the 
Ministry of Finance) where the effects of the proposed price 
increases oh the economy were deliberated. When the proposals 
were accepted (either in the original or amended form) they were 
debated by the ministers of the economic ministries. Thereafter 
the proposals would go to cabinet where a final decision would be 
made, At this level the political merits of the proposed 
commodity price levels would be discussed. Although cabinet 
usually adopted the recommendations of M.E.C.C. acceptance was 
not automatic if political considerations required further 
amendments to price levels.
Selling Prices
Prices were prescribed by Government for produce sold by the 
Marketing Boards on the domestic market to millers, vegetable oil 
expressors, food processing industries, spinners, butchers, and 
in the case of wholemilk directly to the public. Although the 
Ministry of Agriculture was responsible for steering selling 
price proposals through the M.E.C.C. decision making process up 
to cabinet level, this was done in close consultation with the 
Ministry of Trade and Commerce which was responsible for retail 
pricing for processed products (except milk).
B DEVELOPMENTS IN AGRICULTURE PRIOR TO 1970
i ) Introduction
Unlike most African countries Zimbabwe has a well diversified 
agricultural base and, with few exceptions, is self sufficient in 
the production of food and other agricultural commodities in 
normal rainfall years. This situation has not always prevailed 
and it is pertinent to give a brief historical background to 
state intervention in agriculture and the direction of policy before 1970. 8
Four major events determined the course of agricultural 
development during the period from the turn of the century to 
1970. The first was the world wide economic depression which 
started in 1929 which brought about government intervention in 
the marketing of some major commodities because of low prices 
which threatened the economic viability of producing these 
commodities. The second major event was the economic boom and 
industrial , development which followed the second world war and 
continued into the 1950’s. This event caused rapid population 
growth in urban centres which had the effect of greatly 
increasing the demand for agricultural products. The third event 
was the major advances made in agricultural research in the
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agricultural productivity. The final event was the unilateral declaration of independence by the Smith regime in 1965, which 
resulted in economic sanctions being imposed on Zimbabwe and led to a diversification of agricultural production.
ii) Goverment Interventions in Agricultural Marketing and 
Pricing During the Period 1931 - 1970
Direct government intervention in agricultural marketing first 
occured in 1931. The principal food commodity, maize, was 
marketed by farmers through cooperatives up to this time. However 
. low export realisations stemming from the world wide economic 
depression seriously undermined the financial viability of the 
maize- industry and the government of the day established the 
Maize Control Board to stabilise the industry. The object was to 
improve returns to maize producers by stabilising prices through 
higher domestic selling prices and through the centralised 
disposal of exportable surpluses. However the new pricing system 
discriminated against peasant producers.9 After the second world 
war the country went through a period of deficit production. A 
maize price agreement between the government and the R.N.F.U. 
was implemented, and the price was fixed according to a basic 
price, with-annual adjustments made on the basis of changes-in a 
production cost index. This cost plus pricing system together 
with the introduction of high yielding maize varieties during the 
1950’s culminated in overproduction by the end of that decade 
with surpluses being exported at a loss. The pricing agreement 
was dispensed with in 1962 and since then maize prices have been 
set by government in consultation with the relevant marketing 
boards and maize producer representatives. 10
The Cold Storage Commission was established in 1937 to guarantee 
a market and prices for beef cattle production. Prior to this 
world beef markets had slumped in 1922 and again in 1930 and 
created oversupply conditions with consequential subeconomic 
prices for cattle producers. The Cold Storage Commission was 
successful in stabilising the domestic market and creating 
conditions for steady growth of the industry.il After the second 
world war urban demand for beef grew very rapidly as the economy 
boomed and far exceeded beef supplies. Beef prices were buoyant 
and virtually doubled during this period which prompted a rapid 
expansion in the commercial herd. By the end of the 1950’s beef 
supplies satisfied domestic demand and surpluses were available 
for export.12 During this decade a system of guaranteed minimum 
producer prices, averaged out over all grades and payable by the 
G.S.C., operated. These prices were derived from long term
cattle price agreements between the Federal Government and the 
R.N.F.U. In terms of these agreements the risks associated with 
profits and losses of all beef exports were expected to be borne 
; by producers, but in practice, because of poor accounting 
procedures, this provision was not implemented. Government also 
controlled wholesale prices but not retail prices. Anomolies in 
wholesale price setting resulted in consumers of low grade meats 
subsidising consumers of top grade meats. After rapid growth 
during/the 1930’s the communal cattle herd remained fairly static
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in size during the 1940’s and 1950’s
The Dairy Marketing Board was established in 1952. The main 
objectives in doing this was to provide centralised facilities 
for the intake, processing and distribution of milk and dairy 
'products and to equate milk supplies to consumer demand for milk 
products. Prior to 1952 milk and dairy products had been marketed 
through cooperatives. However these had failed to respond 
satisfactorily to the rapidly growing urban demand for dairy 
products during the economic boom and the growth of the white 
urban population following the second world war. Dairy farmers 
were offered guaranteed incentive prices which were based on 
production cost surveys plus an allowance for a profit margin. 
Producer prices were adjusted periodically on the basis of an 
index of input prices.14 During the period of deficit production 
the government was> prepared to subsidise the industry and 
followed a cheap food policy by not allowing consumer prices to 
adjust at the same rate as producer prices.15 However this policy 
ran into difficulties when surplus production was achieved by the 
end of the 1950’s as economically viable export opportunities 
were limited. With the threat of open ended subsidy payments 
government decided to limit the price guarantee to the volume of milk required to meet domestic demand and surplus production was 
priced at net realisation levels. This pricing policy was 
subsequently changed and producer prices for milk were calculated 
as . a blend of the volume of milk sold internally at prescribed 
prices and realisations from sales of milk for manufacturing 
uses.16
The oilseeds processing industry started in Zimbabwe in 1915 with 
the establishment of an expressing plant to process groundnuts 
into _ soap and oilseed cake for livestock feeding. The, industry 
developed fairly rapidly and self sufficiency, in most processed 
oilseed products was soon achieved. During the 1940’s there was 
intense competition between several oilseed expressing companies 
for supplies of groundnuts which was the main oilseed crop. 
Supplies were obtained through sales contracts with groundnut 
producers, most of whom were communal farmers. The instability of 
the market led to government intervention and groundnuts was 
declared a statutorily controlled product in 1952. 17
Other notable government interventions in agriculture prior to 
the 1970’s include the formation of the Agricultural Marketing 
Authority in 1967 (see above). _The youngest . agricultural 
marketing parastatal, the Cotton Marketing Board, was established 
in 1969. This was in response to the phenomenal growth of the 
cotton industry during the 1960’s when it became imperative to 
establish cotton ginneries which involved large capital outlays 
in the main cotton growing areas, as well as catering for the 
need for guaranteed markets and prices especially for the large 
number of peasant farmers producing this crop. Prior to this 
cotton marketing had been controlled since 1936, initially by the 
Cotton Research and Industry Board, and then by the Grain Marketing Board.18
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By 1970, government, had statutorily controlled several major 
agricultural commodities and prices were prescribed annually for 
maize, sorghum (controlled in 1950), cotton, groundnuts, 
soyabeans(controlled in 1969), beef, and milk. Notable exceptions 
were tobacco, sugar, horticultural products, wheat(controlled in 
1970), coffee (controlled in 1972), sunflowers (controlled in 
1983) and millet crops (which again became controlled commodities 
in 1984 after being controlled and decontrolled previously).
iii) Developments in Agriculture in the 1960’sa) Pre - 1965
Tobacco production gained prominence in this country after 1945 
when U.S. dollar restrictions led Britain to source tobacco 
imports from sterling area countries. New tobacco growing areas 
were opened up as export markets expanded and by 1964, the 
industry had become large and sophisticated with well organised 
research facilities and marketing channels. Over 2071 farmers 
(out of a total of 6234 commercial farmers) were tobacco 
growers.19 Output of other cash crops such as cotton, sugar, and coffee was minimal in comparison as production of these 
commodities was in the initial phases of taking off. The growth 
of output of these commodities was mainly the result of much 
improved disease and pest control measures, the introduction of 
better varieties suited to growing conditions in Zimbabwe, and 
irrigation development especially in the Lowveld. 20
A relatively .narrow agricultural base had developed by 1965 with 
a high degree of dependence on flue cured tobacco as the leading 
cash and foreign exchange earning commodity. To a much lesser 
extent beef and sugar were also foreign currency earners. 
Significant quantities of foreign currency was expended in 
importing agricultural inputs, foodstuffs, and textiles which 
amounted to over 24% of total merchandise imports in 1964.21 
Items such as wheat, tea, and coffee were .largely imported. Many 
agricultural inputs also had to be imported and these included 
such items as fertiliser, stockfeeds, packing materials^ and 
tractor implements which nowadays are to a large extent 
manufactured within the country. The country was largely self 
sufficient in edible oils and fats and had developed a relatively 
sophisticated oilseeds expressing industry based mainly on
groundnut production. Livestock industies such as beef cattle 
ranching and dairying satisfied domestic requirements for
livestock products. Cattle ranching, however, was mainly 
concentrated in the drier southern regions of the country and 
tended to be regarded as of secondary importance in the crop 
growing areas of the north. 22
b) Post - 1965The application of economic sanctions on Zimbabwe in 1965 had a 
substantial impact on the commercial farming subsector, and the 
tobacco industry in particular as most external - markets closed 
their doors to further imports of Zimbabwean tobacco.. Because a 
large proportion of crop farmers were tobacco producers, and 
plummeting tobacco prices threatened the financial viability of 
their farms, it became imperative for these farmers to diversify
into alternative farm enterprises. From a national viewpoint it 
became essential to promote the production of other export crops 
to make up for the losses in export earnings stemming from the 
reduced tobacco output, and to implement a policy of import 
substitution for important food commodities such as wheat. 
Measures to foster the process of diversification included 
an agricultural diversification loan scheme which applied specifically to tobacco producers, the introduction of input 
subsidies for fertiliser and diesel and soft loans for irrigation 
development in 1966, and the payment of incentive prices for wheat. 23
The net effect of these diversification policies was that 
flue cured tobacco plantings, which had peaked at 103600 hectares 
in the 1963/64 growing season, had fallen to 41000 hectares by 
1970. Winter wheat production grew from 1700 hectares in 1965 to 
13600 hectares in 1970. Mainly because soyabeans is suited to 
growing in rotation to wheat, plantings to this crop increased 
from 400 hectares to 12000 hectares over the same period. 
Commercial maize plantings grew from 175800 hectares in 1965 to 
,248700 hectares in 1970.24 The beef cattle industry also
underwent a radical change during this period in that many crop 
farmers in the tobacco producing areas of the country diversified 
into cattle production. For example, tobacco producers acquired 
84000 head of cattle between 1966/7 and 1967/8.25 This process 
was assisted by large numbers of cattle having to be moved to the 
northern areas during the drought years of 1966 and 1968 which 
affected the grazing areas of the south particularly. By the end 
of the decade beef cattle production had become an important 
feature of farming systems practiced in the main cropping areas 
where output now rivalled that of the traditional producing areas 
in the south. 26
During the 1960’s a rapid expansion also occured in cotton, 
coffee, and tea production. The phenomenal rate of growth in the 
production of these commodities was led by cotton where output 
increased from 1354 tonnes in 1961 to 151000 tonnes by 1969.27 A 
parallel development of the domestic textile industry assisted in 
expanding the cotton industry. By 1970 a much broader spectrum of 
agricultural commodities was being produced by the large scale commercial farm subsector.
Although diversification policies were not aimed at the communal 
farm subsector some development did take place and cotton was 
found to be suitable for promoting development. The crop was 
appropriate to peasant production in that little capital outlay 
is required, its drought tolerant qualities make it an ideal cash 
crop to grow in marginal rainfall regions where the majority of 
communal lands are situated, and market controls ensure a 
guaranteed income from sales. Communal farm production of cotton 
grew to slightly over a third of the total national cotton area 
and, bescause of lower yields, about 20 per cent of total cotton 
output by the 1970/71 cropping season.28 Much of this development 
took place in the Gokwe area in Midlands Province.
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Several factors contributed to this subsector not generally 
adopting the other "ascending" crops (wheat and soyabeans) in the 
commercial farming- subsector. These included an unsuitable 
agroecological environment for growing these crops in most communal areas, the generally small area cropped per communal 
farm with a heavy emphasis on maize and millet production, 
widespread poverty and the general lack of access to credit 
facilities, and the high capital outlay involved in irrigation 
development.29 Some communal production was undertaken on a large 
scale, however, by Tilcor (now A.R.D.A.) which was a parastatal 
set up with the express objective of promoting agricultural 
development in the communal lands.
AGRICULTURAL PRICING - 19701s
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i) Pricing Policies, prior to 1970
It is noteworthy that no formal agricultural pricing policy 
document was published during this period which set out
government objectives for agriculture. However pricing policies 
for the various statutorily controlled agricultural commodities 
were always formulated generally around a number of key
objectives. Foremost among these was the policy aim of achieving 
and maintaining self sufficieny in major food products such as 
maize, meat, and milk which were periodically in short supply. As 
industrial development took place after 1945 this policy 
objective was extended to satisfying the demand for agricultural 
raw materials from domestic agricultural based industries. 
Closely allied to the policy objective of production self
sufficiency was the goal of maximising foreign exchange earnings 
from exports of commodities Which were produced' in quantities 
surplus to domestic requirements. Production for export was
generally only encouraged when financially favourable export 
.opportunities existed. However goverment was from time to • time., 
prepared to subsidise the production of a particular export 
commodity. These occasions occured when world prices temporarily 
fluctuated below economically viable levels and it was in the' 
long run national interest to maintain production levels, or when 
priority had been placed on exports because of foreign exchange 
shortages (eg. during the U.D.I. era).
In times of deficit production price levels were initially set at 
incentive levels to encourage farmers to increase output to 
satisfy internal demand for particular strategic commodities, and 
once this was achieved, to expand production for export if this' 
was economically viable. A system of producer price incentives 
together with other forms of assistance such as price and market 
controls and state funded research and extension activities 
Served to expand the agricultural industry as a whole.
ii) Pricing Policies - 1970’s
The key objectives of achieving and maintaining production self 
sufficiency of major agricultural commodities and maximising 
export earnings from any surplus production remained in effect 
during the 1970’s. The pricing mechanism was also used to 
continue the policy of diversifying agricultural production which
10
had been initiated alter 1965. Because of economic sanctions 
during this time stringent Input price controls also operated 
which covered virtually the whole spectrum of agricultural 
inputs. Where inputs were not directly priced by government other 
controls such as restrictions on profit markup levels were applied. Also, a foreign exchange allocation system applied to all imports which included imported agricultural inputs. These 
measures had been introduced to avert possible price inflationary 
effects stemming from shortages of essential imported inputs for 
the industry. ThUs an elaborate system of government controls 
over the pricing of agricultural inputs and commodities
culminated in government interventions in all aspects of 
agricultural production during ,the 1970’s.
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iii) Controlled Commodity Price Levels in the 1970’s 
After a period of relatively static producer prices during the 
1960’s there were large increases in nominal prices for most of 
the controlled commodities during the 1970’s and many of them 
more than doubled during the decade (see tables 1 - 6). The 
inflationary trend began when agricultural input prices rose 
sharply as a consequence of the oil crisis which created 
pressures for producer price increases. This was followed by the 
commodity price boom in 1975 and 1976 which significantly 
improved export realisations for those commodities which were 
exported. Large supplementary payments were made to producers of 
commodities which had been priced conservatively 
(eg.maize, cotton). After 1976 pressures for further price 
increases mounted as fertiliser subsidies were removed and input prices escalated which eroded production profitability. Also, as 
many farmers abandoned their farms due to the intensification of 
the war, political and economic pressures were. created whereby 
incentive prices were offered to keep farmers on the land and to 
maintain production levels.
The effects of agricultural pricing on production levels is shown 
in charts 1 - 5 (see Appendix). Maize plantings in the commercial 
subsector had more than doubled from 146000 hectares in 1962/3 to 
299000 hectares in 1971/2. By 1978/9 the area had reduced to 
191000 hectares because of eroded profitability vis a vis other 
commodities and planting reductions due to the war. The area 
increased to 218000 hectares in the following season in response 
to a 40,5% increase in producer price which included an early 
delivery bonus.x The object of the large price increase was to 
reverse the output decline which, together with a drought in the 
previous season, had reduced maize stocks to a few months supply. 
However a midseason drought partly frustrated the attempt to 
boost maize stocks and a further large price increaise was
announced for the following season.
After rapid growth in the 1960’s cotton output steadied and
•- commercial plantings fluctuated between 60000 and 80000 hectares 
during the 1970’s. Communal cotton production grew rapidly from 
29000 hectares in 1970/1 to 78000 hectares in 1973/4 and then 
fluctuated down to 34000 hectares by 1979/80 mainly due to the 
war. In nominal terms cotton prices increased by 129% over the
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decade. The area planted to winter^wheats increased from 14000 hectares in 1970 to 45000 hectares in 1978. This was in response 
to price increases; up to 1977 and soft irrigation loans to 
encourage' irrigation development. Self sufficiency was achieved 
in wheat production in 1976. As export Opportunities for this 
commodity were ..limited, ' and as stocks began to grow, it was 
realised that further expansion would have to be curtailed. Thus 
in 1978 wheat prices were reduced and this had the effect of 
reducing plantings to 33000 Hectares by the;rend of the decade. 
The area planted to soyabeans dropped from 12000 hectares in 
1969/70 to 7500 hectares in 1970/71 and then increased more than 
fivefold to 41000 hectares by the end of the decade. Soyabean 
prices fluctuated during the period, peaking during the Commodity 
price boom of 1974/75 then falling by nearly 19 per cent in 
nominal terms the next season; and remained static at that level 
for three seasons. Prices rose sharply after the 1277/78 season. 
Despite the swings in . soyabean price levels during the decade the 
crop had become a major commodity by 1980. . ; "•
Producer prices for beef cattle were geared towards expansion of 
the industry and more than doubled in the period 1970 to 1980; 
In the early 1970’s the Cold Storage Commission purchased cattld 
at prices based on a chiller grading system. The system relied 
more on visual grading than carcase measurement which proved 
unsatisfactory. A new Carcase classification system wAs 
introduced in- 1977 based on carcase measurement which'1 required 
the introduction of a revised producer price Schedule. Prices 
were set for different grades according to age i flesh 
development, and fat cover. Despite pricev incentives which 
included the introduction of farm gate pricing in 1979 (the C.S.0 
how reimbursed farmers for the cost of transporting cattle to 
C.S.C. abattoirs) the beef cattle industry seriously deteriorated 
towards the end of the 1970's because Of the disruptive effects 
of the war. Veterinary services virtually collapsed and led to 
the loss of over one million head of CattleV - T}retAdairy ; industry 
remained relatively - stable- during most ofthe' decade with - the 
number-of cows in milk^f luCtuating between -47000'arid 51000 Head.; 
In 1979, however} the number of cows' sharply, reduced" to just 
under 44000 whibh was the result of several' producers selling up 
and leaving the industry'. Average prices: ih nominal terms and 
including premium payments rose from 6;24 Cents per kg in 1970-to 
15,54 cents per kg in 1980. ' "
Marketing board selling prices for the : major controlled 
commodities generally tended :not to be fixed in direct 
relationship to changes in.producer prices during the 1970’s. For 
example the local selling price for A' grade maize was static for 
fifteen years from 1960 to 1974 arid only after that year was 
raised to reflect world price trends and to pay fo;r increased 
producer prices: Over the decade producer prices rose at a faster 
rate than selling prices with the former increasing by 62 % and 
the latter by 51 %. Except for 1974, selling prices were fixed at 
a higher level than producer prices. Narrow producedselling 
price differentials and relatively poor- export -realisations 
resulted in large subsidies being paid to the industry towards
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the end-of the decade (see Table 7). Expected export realisations 
from cotton were a very important component in setting producer 
prices because of the very high proportion of total output 
produced for external markets. Producer pricing tended to be 
conservative and this is evident from preplanting price levels 
which were usually below final prices fixed for a particular 
year. Increments to the final price were paid in the form of 
supplementary payments to producers. Selling prices to local- 
spinners fluctuated in response to movements in international 
lint prices but, except for the period 1972 - 1974, were set at a 
slightly lower level than export prices. Proceeds from the sale 
of cotton seed were used to balance the C.M.B. trading accounts. 
When trading deficits did occur they were generally met from 
funds from a stabilisation reserve and only in a few years was 
government support required. Selling prices for wheat and 
soyabeans fluctuated during the period at above and below 
producer prices. Trading accounts for these commodities regularly 
included an element of subsidy which varied in size in accordance 
with governments desire to reduce costs to consumers.
As. a reflection of cheap food policies average wholesale prices 
for beef were consistently below producer prices over the decade 
and below average export prices until 1976. Up to 1974 these 
price differentials were supported by the appropriation of monies 
from a stabilisation reserve fund resulting from previous trading 
profits and no subsidies were required. The industry had to be 
subsidised when export prices dropped below producer prices 
after 1976 and subsidies escalated as the price differentials 
widened. There was a rising cost to government of keeping 
consumer prices for milk down towards the end of the 1970’s. In 
the last few years producer prices and distribution costs 
increased considerably. Government was reluctant to adjust the 
selling prices for milk upwards in 1977 and 1978 and subsidies 
rapidly escalated as the gap between producer prices and consumer 
prices widened.
When consideration is made of price support measures by 
individual commodity (see Table 7) during the U.D.I. era the 
lion’s share of government financial support went to tobacco 
producers who received a total of over $133 million spread over a 
period from 1965 to 1977. The beef cattle industry received just 
over $60 million between 1976 and 1980. Price support payments to 
the maize industry amounted to just under $31 million over the 
period, of which $27 million was paid out between 1978 and 1980. 
The dairy industry received about $11 million in the four years 
preceding 1980 and the cotton industry $7 million in the cropping 
seasons 1969/70, 1978/79 and 1979/80. Other commodities such as 
wheat, sorghum» and oilseed crops received minor payments over 
the period. Drought relief payments to farmers in drought years 
amounted to over $31 million and fertiliser subsidies of about 
$19 million were paid during the period 1971 to .1975. Thus 
government financial support to agriculture was considerable and 
escalated towards the end of the 1970’s chiefly due to the 
greater impact that the war. was having on agricultural productivity and on pricing decisions.
3 2S AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENTS IN THE 1930’s
The advent of independence in 1980 ushered in an era of change.in 
agricultural policy formulation. With different. political 
priorities to those of previous regimes the new government 
rapidly embarked on a path of redressing inequities which had 
arisen from policies of racial descrimination. Thus during the 
first few years there was a preoccupation in removing legal 
obstacles to access by previously disadvantaged races to social 
and economic benefits. Blacks were advanced into positions of 
authority and responsibility in all organisations, and especially 
in the civil service. In agriculture the process of change took several forms. There was a shift of agricultural policy focus 
from the large scale commercial farming subsector to the communal 
farming subsector. While it was not . government policy to 
prejudice productivity in the latter subsector agricultural 
policies were formulated around the overall objective of 
developing the communal areas. The major issues involved were 
land distribution, marketing infrastructure, a .redirection of 
research and extension activities to mainly benefit communal 
farmers, and representation of small scale farmers in the agro- 
political bargaining process. These have had either direct or 
indirect influences on agricultural pricing. 33
By 1986 government had purchased with donor aid assistance over 
3,1 million hectares of land from large scale commercial farmers 
for resettlement purposes.34 The aim was not simply to redress 
the imbalance of land distribution between the farming subsectors 
but also to ease the population pressures on land in the more 
densely populated communal areas. Initially the resettlement 
programme was overambitious in that the first national 
development plan set a target of resettling 162000 communal 
families in three years.35 The resettlement programme was 
designed to ensure that each farmer was allocated enough arable 
land to grow crops suited to the agro-ecological environment 
which would provide an income equivalent to not less than the 
prevailing minimum wage for agricultural workers. The existing 
infrastructure for resettlement was unable to cope with the 
envisaged target in the plan; Moreover the resettlement process 
was hindered by the three year drought period from 1982 to 1984 
when crop failures occured at many of the schemes. This 
necessitated government having to extend financial assistance, in 
the form of drought relief, to resettled farmers for longer 
periods than, was originally intended.
Since that time the resettlement programme has proceeded at a 
more moderate and orderly pace and the resettlement farming 
subsector is developing into a major contributor to the total 
national output of many commodities.36 However in designing the 
resettlement programme target yield levels were not set at levels 
which prevailed prior to resettlement ahd therefore land use 
productivity levels have been lower.37 There is no doubt that the 
resettlement programme has had an impact on the large scale 
commercial farming subsector. The number of farmers in this
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subsector has dropped from over six thousand in 1975 to less than 
four and a half thousand in 1988.38 Much of the decrease was 
caused by farmers abandoning their farms during the war which was 
purchased by government for resettlement after 1980. Other farms 
for resettlement have been purchased on a ‘'willing buyer, willing 
seller" basis since then. This development has contributed to 
the fall in the number of agricultural workers employed on commercial farms and to the decline in the size of the large 
scale commercial beef cattle herd.39
From the outset government has pursued a programme of providing 
communal farmers with ready access to parastatal marketing 
facilities. The objective is that every communal farmer in the 
main cropping areas should ultimately not have to travel more 
than 60 km to market those products being sold to the 
parastatals.40 The lack of adequate marketing infrastructure in 
the communal areas is seen as a major obstacle to the development 
of these areas.41 Because of high transport costs communal 
farmers have been reluctant to transport their produce to 
marketing depots which had been sited to serve the large scale 
commercial farming subsector. Also the system whereby the 
parastatals had employed buying agents to purchase their 
commodities in the communal areas was unpopular in that many 
communal farmers claim to have been cheated either in the 
weighing or the grading of the produce delivered.42 They were 
therefore generally reluctant to sell their products to the 
parastatals. The need to develop marketing infrastructure in the 
communal areas was also spurred by the extension of credit 
facilities to . communal and resettlement farmers by the 
Agricultural Finance Corporation. The number of communal farmers 
receiving loans grew from 18000 in 1980/81 to 77384 in 1986/87.43 
To obtain credit farmers had to register with the appropriate 
marketing parastatal and to commit themselves to selling their 
produce through the parastatal so that a stoporder system could 
be applied to recover A.F.C.loans. Since 1980 there has been a 
very significant increase in the number of farmers registered 
with the two parastatals marketing crop products. For example, 
the number of farmers registered with the G.M.B. from the small 
farm sector increased from 28119 in 1980 to 164480 in 1983.44 
The installation of depots and collection points in the communal 
areas and the involvement of the boards in the transport of 
communal farmers produce in some years has created problems by 
significantly increasing both capital and recurrent
expenditures.45 Although the criteria used in siting these 
marketing outlets require that the locality should already be a significant producer of particular commodities with a potential 
to increase output, in practice low throughput, in some cases 
resulted in non-viability. The total operating costs of the G.M.B. increased nearly seven-fold from $ 18., 2 million in 1981 to 
$127,8 million in 1987, partly as the result of the significant 
expansion of the'Board’s operations.46 These developments have 
contributed to the substantial operating deficits that have 
accrued in the financial; accounts of the boards, and have 
undoubtedly indirectly influenced the'levels at which producer prices are set.
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Another development in the 1980’s has been a reorientation of 
government research and extension activities away from Commercial farm production to communal farm production. The object has been 
to greatly improve productivity in the communal lands by 
developing appropriate production technologies.47 As a means of 
disseminating the new technologies, progress has been made in 
increasing the siae Of the agricultural extension branch of government (Agritex) through additional training facilities and 
training programmes. These measures together with the provision 
of Credit facilities to purchase agricultural inputs should .in 
the long term s^rve to improve productivity in the communal 
lands. Concommitant with governments redirection of research 
efforts has been the development of private research facilities. 
This has been mainly at the instigation of commercial farmers 
although firms supplying agricultural inputs have also 
contributed to private research. While the large scale commercial 
farm subsector still makes substantial grants to government 
research through the Agricultural Research Council, commercial 
farmers felt that the change in government policy would undermine 
efforts to improve productivity in their own subsector. Thus 
private research facilities have been established to cater for 
commercial farming research requirements, mainly for crop 
commodities although recently facilities have been acquired for 
livestock research. In addition the various commodity 
associations which represent commercial farmer interests for 
specific commodities have employed their own extension personnel 
to disseminate new production techniques that are developed 
through research. Because of these measures gains in productivity 
in commercial crop and livestock production have continued in the 1980’s.
Government has implemented a policy of equal representation from 
all the farming subsectors when farmers are involved in 
discussions concerning the agricultural sector. Whereas prior to 
1980 producer representatives on the boards of the marketing 
parastatals and the policy committees of the Agricultural 
Marketing Authority were large scale commercial farmers this has 
now been extended to include members from all farming groups. The 
C.F.U. (previously the R.N.F.U.) has evolved since its inception 
in 1942 under the Farmers Licencing and Levying Act into a highly 
sophisticated lobbying organisation with extensive resources to 
put forward its views on agriculture. Through the legal 
requirement that all large scale commercial farmers purchase a 
annual licence to carry out farming operations all of these 
farmers automatically become members of the union. Licence fees 
and levies on commodity sales are paid to the union and therefore 
the financial support of the union and its affiliated commodity 
associations is guaranteed. The other two farming unions are the 
National Farmers Association of Zimbabwe (N.F.A.Z.) which 
represents communal and resettlement farmer interests arid the 
Zimbabwe National Farmers Union (Z.N.F.U.). which represents 
small scale commercial farmer interests. The N.F.A.Z., formed in 
1980, has only evolved into a fully fledged national union during
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the 1980’s. It evolved from the Master Farmers Associatipn of 
Victoria Province whose membership was made up of communal 
farmers with a master farmers training certificate. Withgovernment. encouragement the union has now assumed a national 
role in its representation of communal farmers. Although its 
membership has now spread to all provinces this comprises only 
some 200000 out of a potential of 700000 to 800000 . communal 
farmers. Despite its lack of resources the N.F.A.Z. has achieved 
some authority in representing the views of communal farmers on 
agricultural matters. The Z.N.F.U. originates from the African 
Farmers Union (formed in 1942), which in turn evolved from the 
" Bantu Farmers Congress which was formed in 1925. This union 
represents approximately 9000 small scale commercial farmers from 
the previous African Purchase Areas.49
Government has frequently stated that it would like to see one 
union representing all categories of farmers. This event has so 
far not occured. The main barrier to amalgamation of the unions 
is the widely divergent interests that the three unions 
individually represent. However there has been a movement towards 
developing a common approach between the unions in their dealings 
with government. The unions formed the "joint presidents 
committee" in 1985 which meets every month to discuss matters of 
mutual interest and to formulate common policies. The committee 
is dhaired by each union’s president oh a rotational basis 
through the year. An example of the unified approach to issues 
which affect the agricultural sector is the change in procedure 
of conducting annual price negotiations for controlled commodities. Prior to 1980 discussions on pricing matters 
involved representatives of the large scale commercial farmers 
only and their, union had considerable influence in pricing 
decisions. After 1980 this situation changed and the other two 
unions were brought in to participate in pricing discussions. 
However the procedure was cumbersome in that three separate and 
sometimes conflicting views on pricing policies were presented to 
government. In order to streamline the approach and facilitate 
discussions it was decided to present joint submissions on prices 
to government * The procedure for the past few years has been for 
the unions to meet before formal pricing discussions with
government begin, to formulate common strategies for use in price
negotiations. Each union is given responsibility for preparing 
the price submissions for commodities in which it has a special 
interest. These are then vetted by the other two unions so that
all views on the pricing of a particular commodity are
represented in the final Submission to government. The final 
submission contains sets of production costings for all three 
types of farming systems. This procedure has now developed to the 
extent that government is made aware of of the various issues 
that affect all categories of farmers and can formulate their 
agricultural pricing policies accordingly.
50E. AGRICULTURAL PRICES IN THE 1980’s „
i) 1980/81 Growing Season
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One of the most pressing problems confronting the new government 
after independence in 1980 was the state of the agricultural 
industry and the measures to be taken to rehabilitate the sector. 
Farming activities in both the commercial and communal areas had 
been badly disrupted by the war and agricultural output had 
declined after the war intensified in the mid -1970’s. Although 
the new government as a matter of policy was committed to 
advancing productivity in the communal areas, at the same time it also wanted to prevent any possible collapse of commercial 
production through an exodus of farmers from the land, and to 
stimulate production from this subsector which would be 
beneficial for the economy as a whole. Commercial farmers had 
beep the main supporters of the previous government and therefore 
were suspicious of the new government’s intentions for the 
subsector. In order to allay these fears and to instil a degree 
of confidence in the new government a white minister, who was 
formerly a president of the R.N.F.U., was appointed to head the 
Ministry of Agriculture. The other measure taken was to announce 
a package of preplanting prices for the 1980/81 season in which 
there were large increases in price levels for some of the major commodities.
While political objectives did influence agricultural pricing 
decisions that year there were other very important 
considerations. Of major importance was the need to rebuild 
stocks of the principal food commodity, maize. The decline in 
commercial maize plantings during the latter half of the 1970’s 
had been reversed the previous season (1979/80) due to a much 
higher price which included an early delivery bonus being offered 
to producers. A mid-season drought, however, reduced yields and 
frustrated the attempt through the price mechanism to increase 
strategic maize reserves up to desired levels. It was considered 
imperative, therefore, to offer further price incentives to 
increase commercial maize output and to encourage communal 
farmers to sell surplus maize through the marketing parastatal. 
Moreover the provision of production incentives through price 
assumed greater importance at around this time because of the 
discontinuation of financial drought relief assistance. 
Previously commercial farmers were able to claim financial 
compensation from government for losses stemming from crop 
failures due to drought. Assistance to communal farmers in 
drought periods had been limited to the provision of food. In a 
change of policy the new government decided there wais no special 
reason for limiting financial assistance to one farming subsector 
and considerable administrative difficulties would be encountered 
in extending the assistance to all subsectors. The new policy 
meant that the financial risk of producing drought susceptible 
crops in the commercial subsector was greatly increased.
A preplanting price for A grade maize iwas announced at $120 per 
tonne for the 1980/81 growing season. This represented a 41 % 
nominal increase ove,r the 1979/80 price, and nearly 100 % over the 
price of $60,50 which applied in the 1978/79 season. Farmers 
responded positively to the announcement and with crop prices 
skewed in favour of maize, commercial plantings to the crop
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increased by nearly 32 %. As the result of good rains a record 
harvest was achieved and deliveries from the commercial subsector 
exceeded 1.65 million tonnes. There was also a good response 
from the communal subsector and 363000 tonnes was delivered to 
the Grain Marketing Board. The much greater volume of deliveries 
affected the operating efficiency of the Board who were in the 
initial stages of implementing the new policy of extending 
marketing facilities to the communal areas. The Board was also 
instructed to involve itself in the transport of communal produce 
to the depots which added to its difficulties and operating 
costs. Board handling costs soared as a consequence and also 
because of the interest payments on the very large sums of money 
borrowed to finance stocks of maize and other commodities.
The very favourable maize price reduced plantings to other 
principal summer crops (cotton, soyabeans) in the commercial 
subsector because of the comparatively moderate price increases 
announced for these alternative commodities. Despite this there 
was a substantial increase in area put to cotton in the communal 
lands which expanded from 24000 hectares in 1979/80 to 72000 
hectares the following year, mainly because the disruptive 
effects of the war on plantings had ended. The substantial price 
award to maize producers also resulted in large price increases 
for livestock commodities because maize is a principal livestock 
feed;
ii) 1981/82 Growing Season
There was a significant increase in consumer demand for food 
products in the early post independence period. Minimum wages had 
been introduced in 1979 and had been set at $20 per month for the 
lowest paid employment categories. As many low paid workers were 
receiving wages in excess of this amount the measure was really a 
token attempt to improve incomes for this income group. The new 
government was deeply committed to raising living standards for 
low income groups and soon raised the minimum wage by 50% to $30 
per month in addition to radically changing labour legislation on 
employment conditions and labour retrenchment. Minimum wages for 
industrial workers which had been set at higher levels were also 
adjusted upwards. The minimum wage for the lowest wage categories 
was again increased early in 1982 by 66% to $50 per month with 
similar increases for other categories of workers.51 The net 
effect of these measures was to greatly improve real incomes for 
low income groups in urban areas and in formal employment in the 
rural areas. Further, real incomes in the communal farm subsector 
improved in 1981 as crops were reaped and sold at enhanced 
prices.
Measures to improve real incomes were augmented by the 
maintenance of cheap food policies. Consumer prices for the main 
food products in some cases did not change or changed minimally 
in comparison to upward adjustments in producer prices (see 
Tables in the Appendix). The discrepancy in prices was most 
noticeable for maize with the A grade producer price set at $120 
per tonne and prices for high quality maize meal set at just over
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$80 per tonne. Some farmers took advantage of this situation by 
not retaining maize for on-farm use and selling it at the higher 
price and buying back milled maize at the lower price. Transport 
costs were offset by the price differential and savings on 
milling costs and made this venture profitable for these 
farmers.52 With greatly improved real incomes in the low income 
groups and low food prices the demand for meat, bread, dairy 
products, and vegetable oil products soared and shortages of some food products started to develop as early as 1981.
The agricultural pricing system for controlled commodities was 
Changed in 1981, and the announcement of preplanting prices for 
these commodities was discontinued. Government introduced a new 
system whereby a pricing policy statement in respect Of 
production requirements would be announced prior to the growing 
season each year without specifying what price levels would be. 
Only in special cases would preplanting prices be announced for 
an individual commodity when circumstances warranted a clear 
indication to producers of government production intentions for 
the commodity. The system of price negotiations between 
government representatives and producers was also changed. 
Whereas previously negotiations would take place at different 
times of the year depending on board intake periods and whether 
preplanting or final prices were being considered. A consolidated 
approach was introduced where negotiations for all the 
statutorily controlled commodities (except coffee) takes place 
after summer crops have been planted. The package of final, prices 
is announced by the Minister sometime during April - May each 
year. In adopting this policy Government sought to reduce the 
risk of committing itself to certain price levels without any 
indication of what farmers planting intentions were, with the 
possible outcome of open ended government subsidies for 
particular commodities.
Agricultural pricing for the 1981/82 growing season was 
influenced by two key factors, marketing board operating deficits 
and the drought. A very large maize trading account deficit had developed from the record intake of this crop of roughly two 
million tonnes during the previous season. It was obvious with 
over two years of domestic maize requirements in reserve and limited export opportunities for this commodity that farmers 
should be encouraged to diversify out of maize production. An 
inter-commodity pricing imbalance had resulted from the very 
large maize price hike in the previous season. In his first 
pricing policy statement in lieu of preplanting price 
announcements, the Minister of Agriculture indicated that there 
was no justification for a further maize price increase in the 
1981/82 growing season, and that farmers would be encouraged to 
diversify into other crops through enhanced prices.
Farmers did not respond to the announcement as expected. Even 
with a rise in input costs from the previous year maize 
production still remained highly profitable. Although plantings 
in the large scale commercial subsector did decrease the 
contraction in area was such that had normal rains prevailed
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difficulties being experienced by the Grain Marketing Board. 
Cotton plantings continued to decline, but soyabean growers 
responded positively to the policy statement and the soyabean 
area increased by 60 %.
By the time final prices for the season were announced drought 
conditions were apparant. Nevertheless the A grade maize price was held static at $120 per tonne while other commodity prices 
were increased to promote a swing out of maize production into 
more drought resistant crops in the following season. This was 
especially so in the case of cotton where some of the commercial 
area had been lost to maiize production for two successive seasons 
and cotton prices were increased by oyer 26 % to reverse the 
trend. A 17,6 % increase was awarded in soyabean prices. 
Excepting maize, price increases were granted for all controlled 
commodities.
iii) 1982/83 Growing Season ,
Price decisions for 1982/83 were influenced by shortages of some 
major food products (eg.vegetable oils, bread, milk) and a glut 
of others (eg.maize, beef) on the domestic market, large trading 
deficits in the financial accounts of the marketing boards, and 
the effects of drought on agricultural production and marketing. 
Shortages of vegetable oil products were serious and steps were 
taken to correct this situation. Prior to the start of the 
growing season a preplanting price increase of 30 % was announced 
for soyabeans to encourage increased output of this commodity. In 
an attempt to gain greater control over oilseed production 
sunflowers was declared a controlled commodity and prices were 
set at $5 per tonne less than soyabean prices. This measure was 
partly in response to a recommendation of the Commission of 
Enquiry into Agriculture that sunflower marketing become 
statutorily controlled. This measure would serve to promote 
development in the communal areas, where the crop was mainly 
grown, by providing marketing facilities and guaranteed prices.
Although government wished to promote oilseed crop and drought 
resistant crop production these were not major considerations in 
decisions relating to cotton prices which were held static. Of 
overriding importance was the unfavourable export realisations 
being received for lint in external markets (see chart 2) and the 
accumulated deficit on the cotton trading account. There was no 
increase in maize prices because of a maize trading account 
deficit caused by still considerable stock levels and limited 
export opportunities. Groundnut prices remained static and it 
appeared that government placed little emphasis on promoting the 
crop. Sorghum prices were moved up to parity with maize prices to 
encourage production of this drought tolerant crop.
Shortages of milk products necessitated imports of milk powder 
and butter oil through an E.E.C. funded aid programme. As a 
consequence government awarded a further 20 % increase in 
producer prices (representing an overall 48 % in two years) for 
milk to promote growth in the industry. Although the D.M.B.:
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was overridden by the objective of regaining production self 
sufficiency when price levels were set. The drought seriously 
affected the beef cattle industry and Cold Storage Commission 
slaughter and cold room storage facilities were unable to cope 
with the very high slaughter levels as farmers destocked. There 
was little scope for exports because of oversupply conditions onv 
world markets, and the glut of meat on the domestic market had to 
be sold to consumers at discount prices to encourage consumption. 
The C.S.C. trading account deficit increased substantially and as 
a consequence no producer price increase was awarded.
iv) 1983/84 Growing Season
The continuing drought conditions and their adverse effects on 
the financial viability of agricultural production dominated 
pricing decisions for the 1983/84 season. Maize stocks had fallen 
to a low level because of abnormally high demand during the 
preceding two years. Producer confidence in growing maize was at 
a low ebb because of crop failures experienced over this period. 
Government therefore announced a guaranteed minimum preplanting 
price of $140 for A grade maize and $287 for B grade soyabeans to 
boost production of these commodities. By the time decisions were 
made on final prices for the season it was evident that drought 
conditions would prevail for the third successive year. While 
maize and soyabean prices were held at preplanting levels, prices 
of all the other controlled commodities were increased by between 
10 - 15 %. Government also declared the two main millet crops(mhunga and rapoko) statutorily controlled crops from the 1st 
April 1984. The object of this action was to promote development 
in the drier regions of the country by offering price and 
marketing incentives for drought tolerant crops as alternatives 
to maize. These areas are not agro-ecologically suited to maize 
production and crop failures due to drought are frequent. 
Nonetheless the crop is increasingly being grown because of the 
strong local preference for maize over small grain crops.53
Although drought was the dominant factor influencing pricing 
decisions significant input price increases had occured and 
average price inflation had risen to over 15 % per annum thereby 
reducing the financial viability of farm production. In 1983 
government took firm action to reduce the trading losses of the 
marketing boards by raising both selling prices and consumer 
prices for major food commodities. This action had the effect of 
dampening consumer demand for milk, meat, and vegetable oil 
products, especially among the lower income groups. The new 
policy affected all the main livestock industries (beef cattle, 
dairy, pig, and poultry production) as there were very large 
increases in stockfeed prices when prices for basic ingredients 
like maize, cottonseed meal, and soyabean meal were adjusted 
upwards.
v) 1984/85 Growing Season
Maize stocks had dwindled to well below annual consumption
22
intake for the 1983/84 crop and imports would therefore be 
necessary to make up the shortfall! The maize trading account was 
still in deficit although this had halved because of the depletion of stocks. Government therefore took, action to 
stimulate maize production in the 1984/85 growing season and 
to reverse the apparent downward trend in plantings to this crop 
in the large scale commercial subsector. A preplanting price of 
$180 per tonne for A grade maize was announced. A feature which 
later influenced'decisions on final 1984/84 maize prices was the 
much larger than expected maize intake from communal farmers for 
the 1983/84 growing season which had reduced previously envisaged 
import' requirements. It was obvious that this farming subsector 
was, growing in prominence in supplying the country's maize 
requirements. >.
Commercial maize plantings increased marginally by•5% to 200000 
hectares in response to the preplanting'price as farmers, after 
three seasons of drought, were reluctant to increase production. 
Commercial plantings to drought tolerant sorghum,, on the other 
hand, nearly doubled. The drought broke this season and good 
yields were expected for the summer crops in all the farming 
subsectors. A large maize intake was forecast by the time final 
prices were fixed and the Grain Marketing Board was again faced 
With the problem of financing large maize stockpiles. The A grade 
maize price was confirmed at $180 per torxne and all other crop 
prices were increased when final prices were announced. Groundnut 
prices rose by 50% in an effort to stimulate interest in this 
crop. Several years qf low prices in.relation to other crops had 
reduced groundnut plantings. Sorghum prices were, adjusted upwards 
to parity with maize prices while other crop prices were raised 
by between 10 - 20%. Milk prices Were increased by 7 .5 % but beef 
cattle prices remained static. The C.S.C. trading deficit was a 
major factor in arriving at the latter decision even though beef shortages were already becoming apparent (see Table 7).
vi) 1985/86 Growing Year
Normal rains prevailed during the 1985/86 summer crop growing 
period and by the time final prices were decided another large 
grain intake was anticipated. Communal farmers had delivered an 
unprecedented 819000 tonnes.of maize to the Grain Marketing Board 
the previous season and total deliveries had amounted to over 1,8 
million tonnes. Exports of maize had been just over half of the 
half million tonnes originally predicted and average export 
realisations liad been lower than the domestic selling ^rice.54 
The sorghum price parity with maize resulted in many commercial 
farmers growing this crop and total deliveries approximated to 
four years of domestic consumption requirements. Deliveries of 
millet crops, almost exclusively produced by small scale farmers, greatly exceeded expectations and with domestic demand at less 
than 1000 tonnes per annum and little scope for exports the Board 
held large unsaleable stocks of these commodities. With high 
grain stocks .the Grain Marketing Board deficit had more than doubled to $46 million. .
As a consequence all summer grain crop prices were neia static 
while other crop prices were moved upwards to encourage 
diversificationi Emphasis was placed on oilseed production and export potential. The beef cattle price schedule was increased by 
15 % in an effort to boost output and to promote an, increase in
the size of the large scale commercial breeding herd which had 
declined significantly since the 1982 - 84 drought period.
Seasonal shortages of beef had developed and the Cold Storage 
Commission was experiencing difficulties in offpeak months
because of a low throughput of slaughter animals. In addition 
government wanted to encourage the industry because negotiations 
had been entered into to secure an export sales contract of 8100 
tonnes of deboned beef to the E.E.C. under the Lome Convention which grants favourable tariff terms to member dountries (ie a 
rebate of 90% of import levies payable to the Community is 
granted).55 Exports to this market commenced in October 1985 but 
the C.S.C was not able to fully meet the quota because of the 
beef shortage.
No price increase was granted for milk. The dairy industry had 
responded very favourably to incentive pricing earlier in the 
decade and the situation had been reached where supply now 
threatened to outstrip demand. Another factor which influenced 
this decision was that consumer price adjustments had lagged 
behind those for producers with the result that the Dairy 
Marketing Board was incurring a trading loss in excess of 
$1 million per week. Further, inefficiencies due to uneconomic 
expansion after 1980 and because of a high turnover of 
experienced staff added to the Boards operating costs and 
contributed to the deficit. The intention in the pricing decision 
was to hold producer prices static while raising consumer prices! 
to correct the pricing imbalance. "
vii) 1986/87 Growing Season
Normal rains the previous season had aggravated the summer grains 
stock position of the Grain Marketing Board and its trading 
deficit. Government therefore had to take steps to avoid a 
further increase in grain stockpiles and adopted a new pricing 
strategy towards these commodities. A preplantinig price quota was 
announced for large scale commercial maize production. Producers 
would be allowed to deliver 1000 bags of maize plus the equivalent of 50% of their previous years maize deliveries at 
$180 per tonne for A grade maize, and any excess deliveries over this amount would be priced at $i00 per tonne. Stocks of sorghum 
now exceeded five years of internal consumption requirements and. 
therefore a preplanting price of $100 per tonne for A grade red 
sorghum was announced which represented a 44% decrease in price 
from the previous season. The reduction was to apply to all 
sorghum supplies from agroecological regions I,II, and III, while 
supplies from the other two regions would be priced at $180 per 
tonne (A grade). A similar strategy was adopted for millet crops 
where, for example, stocks of mhunga (bullrush millet)
represented over 170 years of domestic consumption at prevailing'‘ ’ < ' - '
demand levels.
The net result of the new pricing policy was that large scale 
commercial maize plantings contracted considerably to approximately two thirds of the 1985/86 area. The impact of the 
sorghum price reduction on commercial sorghum plantings was even 
more dramatic and area reduced by nearly 80%. Another drought 
had become evident by the time final prices were fixed and the 
price quota on maize was waived and the full price was paid for 
all deliveries. The top grade cotton price was increased by over 
9% to encourage the production of top quality cotton, oilseed 
crop prices were raised by between 13 - 20 %, and wheat prices by 
10 %. Government made it clear in various policy statements that 
oilseed crop production would be promoted firstly to attain self- 
sufficiency, and then to take advantage of any favourable export 
opportunities for surpluses. Milk prices remained static for the 
third consecutive year as the oversupply position became more 
serious with excess supplies being Converted to milk powder.
rA 30 % increase in the beef price schedule was announced to
stimulate beef supplies for local consumption and export. The 
large price increase was the result of several factors. Shortages 
of beef had led to significant rises in cattle prices on the open 
market. Many producers found it much more profitable to sell 
their cattle for slaughter through private abattoirs, rather than 
to the Cold Storage Commission whose price schedule was fixed, 
and therefore could not compete with prices being offered by 
private traders at cattle auctions. The Commission was undergoing 
severe financial difficulties which was adding to its trading 
account deficit, largely because of the reduced cattle intake 
through its slaughter facilities. In addition a black market for 
beef was developing because of shortages with many butchers 
ignoring government gazetted consumer prices for various beef 
cuts. Some were flouting meat inspection regulations and posing a health hazard to the public. Government was also concerned that 
the upswing of cattle sales on the open market threatened 
supplies of slaughter cattle to the C.S.C. for export. Exports of 
beef to the E.E.C. under the Lome Convention had commenced in 
October, 1985, and soon afterwards government introduced an
export incentive of 30 cents per kg for top grade cattle over and 
above the C.S.C schedule prices to promote supplies of cattle of 
the desired quality for export. Despite these price incentives 
open market prices being offered to producers were still very 
competitive. As C.S.C. could not compete government placed
severe restrictions on private abattoir activities and banned the 
sale of non - C.S.C. meat in main urban centres.
viii) 1987/88 Growing Season
Despite the drought of the previous season government did not 
announce any preplanting prices. Stock levels of grain
commodities were adequate to cope with any low intake in the 
event of another <|rought. In its final pricing package for the
previous season government had given a clear indication of its
production intentions for the following season. Farmers responded
i
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accordingly by not expanding the area put to summer grain crops 
and increasing plantings to oilseed crops and winter wheat. Good 
rains ensued and by the time final price were fixed good yields 
per hectare for the summer crops were expected.
The price for A grade maize was raised from $180 to $195 per 
tonne after three years of static maize prices. Cotton prices 
were increased by 6,2% which represented the lowest percentage 
increase in the 1987/88 pricing package. This action was mainly a reflection of the poor trading performance of the Cotton 
Marketing Board due to failing prices received for cotton lint 
exports, and because lint prices in domestic markets had not been 
adjusted upwards for three years. Percentage increases awarded to 
soyabeans, groundnuts, and sunflowers ranged between 9 - 11 %. 
This represented an increase in real terms as total production 
cost rises from the previous year were approximately 6%.57 The A 
grade red sorghum price was raised to $130 per tonne which was 
well below an economically viable level for large scale 
commercial production. The intention was to discourage production 
from this farming subsector which had been the main contributor 
to the build up of stock levels during the 1984 - 86 period. 
Millet prices remained Static because of high stockpiles and low 
domestic demand for these commodities. Wheat prices were 
increased by just over 10 % to encourage a further expansion in 
wheat plantings.
The beef cattle price schedule was increased by 7,5 % to partly 
offset production cost increases and maintain the momentum of 
the improved economic viability of cattle production. In a move 
to counter the growing trading losses of the Cold Storage 
Commission on the domestic market wholesale beef prices were 
raised at the same time as the producer price announcement. This 
procedure was adopted to counter the growing tendency in the 
government decision making process of adjusting selling prices 
well after producer price changes with the consequence that the 
marketing boards incurred heavy trading losses in the intervening 
period because of the discrepancy between procurement costs and 
unchanged selling prices. The same procedure was not adopted for 
the crop commodities however.
The two major problems plaguing the dairy industry was the Dairy 
Marketing Board trading account deficit and growth in milk 
supplies. An imbalance between producer and consumer prices was 
the main contributing factor to the trading account position. 
The increase in milk output aggravated the deficit position in 
that the price discrepancy carried through to each extra litre 
produced. . Dairy production, in common with beef cattle 
production, has a relatively inelastic short term supply response 
to price changes. In a departure from normal procedure government 
indicated that a formula should be derived between the D.M.B. and 
producers to resolve the problems of the industry. After several 
months of negotiations a two tier pricing system was recommended 
which was similar to the system that had operated in the early 
1960’s. The plan proposes a realignment of producer and consumer, 
prices to take place over a five year period with a four cent and
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eight cent per litre annual price adjustment to producer and 
consumer prices respectively. At the same time growth in output 
would be limited to an overall 5% per annum and constrained by 
the implementation of a price quota. Approximately 70% of the 
total intake representing the proportion sold directly to 
consumers received a producer price of 49 cents per litre 
initially, while the balance representing milk sold for 
industrial purposes received a producer price of 35 cents per 
litre. For individual dairy farmers, the quantity ratio in which 
payment is made at the respective price levels is established from each producers growth in output over the previous three 
years. For example, those with no growth over three years are 
paid at the higher price for all deliveries, while those 
exceeding an average of 5% growth per annum receive this price 
for only 70% of deliveries.
1L. DISCUSSION QF AGRICULTURAL PRICING POLICIES DURING THE ISIOlS
The effects of agricultural pricing policies during the 1980’s is 
outlined in this section :-
i) The volume and cost of financing stock levels, and trading 
account deficits and resulting subsidies have been key factors in 
setting producer prices for summer grain commodities. 
Maize supplies and therefore stock levels have fluctuated widely 
due to the marked variation in annual precipitation levels during 
the decade. Local selling prices have been influenced by consumer 
price levels and government cheap food policies which have 
aggravated Grain Marketing Board trading deficits. Export 
opportunities at prices which cover procurement and marketing 
board handling costs have generally been restricted to regional 
markets and exports to world markets were undertaken at 
substantial losses. Maize price levels in the second half of the 
decade have been set with the objective of securing adequate 
supplies to satisfy annual domestic demand and to maintain a 
contingency reserve of several months offtake. Any surplus to 
requirements has been exported although transport constraints 
have been a major factor in limiting maize exports on occasion. 
In the latter half of the decade steps were taken through the 
pricing mechanism to diversify the maize supply base from the 
previous heavy reliance on the large scale commercial farming 
subsector to a much broader supply spread from all subsectors. In 
adopting this policy government indicated that it does not want 
the national staple food commodity primarily sourced from one 
farming subsector. 58
An interesting feature.which affects maize marketing and prices 
is the existence of two different marketing systems for this 
product. In Zone A areas the G.M.B. has a total monopsony on the 
purchase and sale of commodities for which it is responsible and 
only has a residual buying function in Zone B areas where these 
commodities are traded freely within zone boundaries. In Zone A 
areas prices are,fixed whilst in Zone B areas they fluctuate 
according to changes in demand and supply. The existance of the 
two pricing systems affects incomes earned from drought
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susceptible crops (eg maize) particularly, as volumes of output 
vary widely between seasons because of yield variations. In Zone 
A areas fixed prices and output fluctuations result in income 
instability and a higher degree of production risk for maize than 
in Zone B areas.59 / '
Prices rise when there are maize shortages in Zone B areas which 
compensates for lower Output levels and results in greater income 
stability. In addition Zone B maize producers also enjoy a 
higher average level of prices for maize in the long run- than 
their Zone A counterparts. For example, in 1988 maize was selling 
in Chivu for three times the G.M.B. price.60 Theoretically in 
times of surplus production in Zone B areas maize prices should fall to the point where supply and demand are equated. However 
because of the G.M.B.’s residual buying function in these areas 
prices fall to the level offered by the Board. Provided the Board 
has sufficient maize stocks for sale, upward movements in maize 
prices in a. shortage situation are restrained by G.M.B. selling 
prices, as these represent the opportunity cost to paying 
prevailing prices arising from private trading in the communal 
areas. Thus G.M.B. purchasing and selling prices probably have a 
buffer effect in narrowing the price fluctuations that would 
occur in a free market situation.
During the 1982-84 drought period maize prices escalated in Zone 
B areas particularly affected by crop failures. Illegal maize 
trading did take place, with some zone B farmers transporting 
surplus maize across zone A areas to other zone B areas rather 
than selling directly to the G.M.B. The effects of the current 
Zone B pricing system on the levels of surplus maize formally 
marketed by communal farmers requires investigation. This is of 
importance because in planning national production targets there 
is a greater potential unreliability of supply from the communal 
farm subsector than the other subsectors. In times of shortages 
communal farmers will not deliver maize to the Board if better 
prices are received from private trading. Loan recovery systems 
which rely on stop orders placed on deliveries of produce to the 
Boards would be rendered ineffective if farmers decide to sell to 
private buyers at higher prices.
Incentive prices for the other summer grain commodities led to a 
large build up of stock’levels by the mid - 1980's because of low 
internal demand and few favourable opportunities for exports. 
Recent price reductions for sorghum reflect governments intention 
to limit production to levels more consistent with the domestic 
demand for this product. Millet crop prices have remained static 
since 1984 in an attempt to reduce supply levels. Unless 
measures can be taken to significantly reverse the very low 
internal demand for these commodities oversupply problems will 
continue into the future. The very predominant preference for 
maize among consumers, however, militates against improving the 
demand for millet products. It is becoming increasingly apparant 
from these marketing limitations that the original government aim 
of controlling these commodities to promote development in the 
drier regions of the country has a strong prospect of failure
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(unless research in food processing technology, is successful in 
improving demand for these products in the near future). It may 
therefore become necessary to decontrol these crops to release 
the Board from the financial liabilities imposed by holding large 
unsaleable stocks.
ii) Because cotton is predominantly an export crop producer 
prices" have been largely influenced by realisations in external 
markets. As in the case of the tobacco industry the removal of \ 
economic sanctions in 1980 markedly improved export prospects for 
cotton. Soon after independence the procedure whereby technical
, and broking services were provided by /the Zimbabwe Cotton 
Corporation to the Cotton Marketing Board to enable it to market 
lint efficiently in local and external markets was discontinued 
and the latter institution took over these functions. World 
cotton prices fluctuated during the 1 decade with export 
realisations remaining static early in the decade then rising 
sharply after- 1982 and falling after 1985, After a large 
percentage increase in 1981 Cotton producer prices remained 
static for two years and since then have been rising despite 
falling export realisations after the mid - 1980’s (see Chart 2). 
Current policy is that because of the importance of cotton as a 
foreign currency earner, and also because in the long term losses 
are recouped when world prices rise, government is prepared to 
subsidise the industry when unfavourable prices are received for 
exports. When this, situation occurs greater emphasis is placed on 
the economic viability of production, and producer prices may be 
increased in the face of falling world prices.
Local lint prices followed a similar price rise trend although at 
a lower rate of increase than producer prices up to 1985/86 and 
then remained static until 1988. In 1985 the local lint price was 
set at a level which covered procurement costs and board handling 
-costs. Static prices resulted in the C.M.B. incurring substantial 
losses in lint trading on the domestic market as procurement 
costs and handling costs rose after 1985. Cotton farmers also 
felt that this policy prejudiced their potential earnings from 
cotton in that local, textile industries were being supplied with 
underpriced lint. After prices nearly doubled in the first half 
- of the decade cotton seed prices remained static up to 1988. 
These are set at levels well below lint prices as cotton seed is 
regarded as a by-product of lint production. The policy of using 
cotton seed realisations as a balancing item in the C.M.B.
, trading accounts appears not to have been applied after 1985. <
iii) Much emphasis has been placed on oilseed crop production 
after vegetable oil shortages occured in the early part of the 
decade. Pricing policy since then has been primarily aimed at
■, achieving vegetable oil self sufficiency, the promotion of 
oilseed crop production (especially groundnuts) for export, and 
to maintain economic viability.in the agricultural sector by 
further promoting a diversification of crop production. Soyabeans 
are predominantly produced by large scale commercial farmers and 
recently the crop has been promoted by incentive pricing. Besides 
other objectives the policy was also aimed at reducing this
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farming subsectors output of grain commodities as the volume of 
marketed grain from the other farming subsectors increased in the 
latter half of the decade,by offering a financially attractive 
substitute crop. The success of this polidy is evidenced by the 
. large increase in soyabean plantings after the mid,- 1980’s as 
the commercial ^arm area put to grain crops contracted. Other 
important aspects to encouraging an increase in soyabean output 
have been the development of export markets within the Southern African region for soyabean products (especially soyabean meal), 
and import substitution advantages in that soyabean meal 
- replaces fish meal in formulating feeds for the rapidly expanding 
poultry and pig meat industies. ,
After a period of declining output due to indifferent pricing 
groundnut production in the commercial farm subsector increased 
substantially after 1986 in response to incentive prices being 
offered for the commodity, j Sales of groundnuts to the Grain 
Marketing- Board from the communal farm subsector, however, 
have remained at very low levels, and this may have been caused 
by more attractive prices being received by growers within the 
communal areas. Government’s increased interest in this crop 
stemmed from its drive to promote exports because of foreign 
exchange shortages, and the export potential for confectionary 
nuts derived from favourable prices being offered in overseas 
markets. After sunflowers became a controlled Commodity in 1983- 
prices have been set at levels closely allied to soyabean prices. 
Expansion in sunflower production in the commercial farm 
subsector onlyoccured after positive steps were taken to reduce 
grain production by commercial farmers in 1986. The previous lack 
of interest probably stemmed from the difficulties of growing the 
crop and the lack of suitable high yielding varieties. Communal 
farmers production response to price incentives for sunflowers 
has been relatively indifferent. It is apparent that pricing • 
policies for alternative commodities have probably had a greater 
influence on sunflower production recently than sunflower pricing 
itself. Because of the comparatively lower yields per hectare 
/ achieved for sunflowers in relation to soyabeans it is obvious
' that a more flexible pricing ratio between the two commodities 
should be adopted if continued expansion of sunflower output is 
to be encouraged. (
iv) Zimbabwe has not been self Sufficient in wheat production 
since the late 1970’s and wheat, stockpiles were depleted by 1982. 
Production has fluctuated widely during the 1980’s mainly due to 
the depletion of water resources during the drought period (see 
Chart 4); The crop is well suited to growing in rotation v with 
soyabeans and producers of both commodities benefited from 
incentive pricing since early in the decade. In its drive to 
achieve self sufficiency in wheat production government 
introduced a loan system with low interest rates for irrigation 
development in 1985 which is tied to wheat productionBeing 
grown during- winter months wheat is the only controlled crop 
commodity for which a preplanting price announcement is made.
Wheat import parity prices are an important consideration when \
producer prices are determined. Prices during the 1980’s have 
tended to be set conservatively and pegged at below import parity
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levels (see Table 4). This cautious approach indicates 
governments objective of reaching a level of self sufficiency in 
wheat production With little or no surplus for export because of 
the very limited potential of Zimbabwe being able to compete 
successfully with major wheat producing countries in world 
markets. Export potential is limited to countries within the 
S.A.D.C.C. region, and even then Zimbabwean wheat exports would 
face intense competition from those emanating from South Africa 
and international food aid transfers.
v) The long term nature of beef cattle production adds to the 
difficulty of determining appropriate price levels for this 
commodity because of the necessity of having to forecast what 
future market requirements are likely to be. in general beef 
pricing policies did not favour the interests of producers during 
the early to middle years of the decade and the consequences of 
stop - go pricing policies were still being experienced towards 
the end of the decade. In hindsight the response of holding 
prices constant or awarding small price increases due to the 
oversupply situation during the drought years was detrimental, 
not only to producer interests, but also, in the long run, to the 
financial viability of the Cold Storage Commission^ This pricing 
policy was aimed specifically at alleviating the short term 
adverse financial consequences of the substantially increased 
C.S.C. throughput due to destocking. In turn this increased the 
trading deficit because of the imbalance between producer prices 
and wholesale selling prices. The latter prices were set at 
levels determined by cheap food considerations (see Table 5). 
Had producers received better prices at the time the improvement 
in production viability would have reduced the rate of destocking 
as they would have been able to afford to buy in more stockfeeds 
and maintain a larger nucleus of breeding stock on their farms. 
This would have assisted in accelerating the growth of the 
commercial herd size after the drought period and gone some way 
towards preventing the much reduced C.S.C. annual throughput 
which adversely affected the Commission’s financial performance 
later on in the decade. The better supply situation would have 
also served to dampen the bouyancy of open market prices and the 
burgeoning black market in beef which started to develop in 1985. 
Thus short term subsidy considerations in the early 1980’s may 
have in fact compounded the financial difficulties being 
experienced by the Commission towards the end of the decade.
Another feature which should assume more relevance in determining 
beef pricing strategies in the future is the ratio of beef prices 
to those of competing meat products. Beef supply deficits arising 
in future drought periods are likely to become more acute as 
Zimbabwe’s population grows. Up to and including the 1980’s beef 
cattle producers enjoyed a marketing advantage over, producers of 
alternative meats in that there was an element of subsidy in 
consumer prices for beef which created an artificially high 
demand for beef relative to other meats. This adversely affected 
th<e ability of poultry, pig, and sheep producers, whose products 
were not subsidised, to compete freely in the market. As, 
production cycles for these alternative products are very much
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shorter when compared to beef production, recovery from supply 
deficits is also much shorter. In line with trends in meat 
production in the northern hemisphere there would be advantage in 
creating a more competitive environment for meat production in Zimbabwe by allowing consumer prices for beef to rise to levels 
which would equate supply and demand in a less controlled market. 
This would reduce the very heavy dependence on one product which 
has a greater susceptibility to drought and a lengthy supply 
response in meeting the consumer demand for meat when adverse 
grazing conditions deplete cattle numbers.
vi) Incentive producer pricing for milk early in the decade, was 
successful in stimulating output back to self-sufficiency levels 
by the middle of the decade. However standstill pricing in the 
latter half of the 1980’s had the undesirable effect of 
increasing output further because of the relatively inelastic 
supply response of milk supply to diminishing gross margins as 
production costs increased during this period. In turn the 
increase in milk, output served to exacerbate the operating 
deficits of the Dairy Marketing Board because of the imbalance 
between producer and consumer prices for milk. It remains to be 
seen whether the previously mentioned new agreement between dairy 
producers and the Board will alleviate the financial viability 
problems facing the industry. Thus milk pricing policies from the 
middle of the decade to 1988 appear to have destabilised the 
dairy industry and measures have had to be taken to curb the 
rapid growth rate in output and to introduce an economically 
viable ratio between producer and consumer prices to improve the 
financial position of the Board.
vii) The general inflation of agricultural input prices which 
began in the 1970’s after a period of relative price stability 
accelerated in the 1980’s (see chart 6). The three main input 
areas affected by rising costs were labour, imported inputs or 
inputs with an imported element, and stockfeeds. Like in many 
lesser developed countries with relatively abundant and cheap 
labour supplies and scarce and expensive capital resources, 
Zimbabwe enjoys a comparative advantage in the production of 
commodities which use a high input of labour in relation to other 
inputs. In the production of some major commodities (eg tobacco, 
cotton, coffee, horticulture, sugar, tea) labour costs comprise a 
significant proportion of total direct costs (estimates for 
tobacco production exceed 33%).61 These commodities are major 
exports. Governments minimum wage policies during the 1980's have 
had a significant impact in increasing production Costs of these 
commodities with the consequence that price levels have risen and 
reduced their competitiveness in international markets.
A high level of short term borrowings (especially for the public 
sector) in external financial markets occured in the early post 
independence era, which led to foreign debt repayments amounting 
to over 30 % of foreign currency earnings towards the end of the 
decade.62 This development, together with other macroeconomic 
policies, placed strains on the economy, and foreign currency 
shortages reduced the countries ability; ,to import essential
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inputs for the private sector. These policies also culminated in 
a large depreciation in domestic currency exchange rates which 
significantly raised the cost of imports in local currency terms. 
Despite the system of floating exchange rates an element of 
moderate overvaluation of. the Zimbabwean dollar persisted into — 
the late 1980*s.63 Currency overvaluation affected export 
producers particularly as the local price equivalents for their 
products were depressed in relation to the true value of the 
dollar.
Comparatively rapid price inflation during the 1980’s had a 
profound effect on the agricultural sector in the production of 
those commodities where a high degree of imported input usage 
prevails. Shortages of many essential inputs served to fuel the 
price inflation in that farmers often had to pay higher than 
legally permitted prices to obtain the necessary items to carry 
out their farming operations. The economic viability of
production was seriously eroded over the period as producer 
prices for many commodities did not rise as fast as costs of 
production (see chart 6). The resulting squeeze in profitability 
was only partly offset by advances in production technology. 
Research into cost saving production methods (eg minimum tillage techniques) gained greater prominance during the decade.
Productivity also continued to improve with the adoption by 
growers of new seed varieties for some commodities during the 
decade. A general lack of reliable production data for the 
communal farm areas persists and firm conclusions on improvements 
in productivity cannot be drawn. However Increased sales of many 
of the major commodities produced in these areas to the marketing 
boards, and the fact that many communal farmers now have access 
to credit facilities to buy inputs, indicate that yields are 
probably increasing. The effects of input price inflation on 
production viability will assume greater significance as communal 
farmers adopt production techniques which require a higher 
application of purchased inputs in the future.
The effects of price inflation in reducing the economic viability 
of agricultural production in the 1980’s was exacerbated by the 
existence of two pricing methods in agricultural pricing. Many 
agricultural inputs are priced using the standard "mark-up" 
pricing system which is commonly practiced in commerce. This 
method has the advantage of retaining the purchasing power of 
returns to the seller in a price inflationary situation. The 
second inethod of pricing involves restoring gross margins in 
nominal dollar terms to previous levels, which has the 
disadvantage of not taking into account the full depreciation in 
purchasing power Caused by price inflation. The second method has 
tended to be favoured in setting producer prices for controlled 
commodities. The use of two methods in pricing inputs and output 
has contributed to a general decline in profitability levels and 
increased risks of production during the decade. It has also 
resulted in the sometimes large producer price awards that have 
been necessary during the decade to reverse marked declines in 
levels of production for some commodities due to eroding profit 
levels. Finally the two pricing systems in operation create a
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bias in the terms of trade between agriculture and the
manufacturing and distribution sectors which favours the latter 
sectors in times of price inflation.
- Stockfeeds are the major input in livestock production and in 
many livestock production systems feeding costs comprise more 
than half of total direct costs. The stockfeed industry in 
Zimbabwe is relatively well developed and the country is largely self sufficient in the production of this major input. The 
industry uses locally produced grain and oilseed by-products as 
basic ingredients in the manufacture of stockfeeds, and stockfeed 
pricing is highly dependent on the prevailing levels of marketing 
board selling prices. Prices of some by-products (eg cotton seed meal) are directly set by government. Stockfeed prices rose 
markedly after the removal of the subsidy element in oilseed cake 
prices in 1983. This resulted in a much reduced economic 
viability for livestock production other than those systems based 
primarily on grassfeeding. This prompted many livestock producers 
(especially dairy farmers) to home-mix their own feed
concentrates, to increase fodder usage in feeding programmes, and 
to develop legume and other types of pastures on their farms. 
Other than for this event the pattern of producer and selling 
price setting for the major stockfeed input crops (maize, cotton, 
and soyabeans) has generally been advantageous to livestock 
production in the latter half of the decade. Periods of static 
maize and oilseed meal prices have contributed to stockfeed 
prices being similarly held constant at certain times during this 
period.
viii) In response to the sometimes high operating deficit levels 
of the agricultural marketing boards during the 1980’s there has 
been a move to develop better methods of pricing the various 
controlled commodities which take into account efficiency
criteria. Some work has been carried out by researchers (eg
Jansen, Morris, O’Driscoll and Takavarasha) on the use of 
domestic resource cost analysis in agricultural pricing which is
used to measure the social cost and comparative advantage to the
country of producing different commodities.64 The method relies 
heavily on the use of border prices in determining pricing 
efficiency standards for tradable inputs and commodities andopportunity costs in deriving efficiency standards for non-traded 
inputs and outputs. The methodology is still in the early stages 
of development and sometimes very subjective estimates are made 
in computing shadow prices for items such as communal area 
labour, and the level of domestic currency over-valuation. 
Accurate costs of production modelling is critical to assessing 
the relative advantage to the country of producing particular 
commodities otherwise wrong conclusions are drawn. There are also 
several other difficulties associated with this type of analysis. 
Nevertheless as more information becomes available in the future 
it is possible that domestic resource cost analysis can play a 
useful role in agricultural price determination.
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Agricultural pricing policies, in a very general sense, have been successful in achieving production targets for the various 
statutorily controlled commodities, and have maintained food 
self-sufficiency for most products during the 1980’s. They have also served to induce communal farmers to increase their sales of 
surplus production of several commodities to the marketing boards 
thereby improving the cash economy of that subsector. Moreover 
government has pursued its intention to maintain low food prices 
for low income groups and consumers have benefited from 'cheap 
food’ policies during the decade.65 However, the situation was 
not achieved without problems, and this section has outlined some 
of these. From an evolutionary aspect it can be said that price 
setting for controlled agricultural commodities in the 1980’s has 
been more complicated than in previous decades. The levels of 
price inflation experienced were generally much higher than those 
experienced previously which makes setting correct price levels 
and achieving a satisfactory balance of intercommodity price 
relationships more difficult. Fluctuations in output due to 
unpredictable factors such as drought, and the financial 
consequences of these swings in production further complicated 
the process of setting “correct” price levels. This experience 
should contribute to the development of better agricultural 
pricing methodology in the future.
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OPPEND I X
Table 1 MAIZE PRODUCTION AND PRICES
G r o w i n g P r o d u c e r
Y e a r  . .  . . P r  i c e  •*
, . $  / t o n n e
: 68/9 .. . 33. 55
69/70 , : 39. is'. •
70/1 34. 3£
71 /£ . £9. 59
7S/3 39. 71
73/4 39. 3£
74/5 41.61
75/6 47. 34
76/7 . 51.70
77/8 51.99
78/9 60.50 .
79/80 . 85.00
80/1 iso. 0 0
'81/S' 1£0. 00
8£/3 ISO.00
83/4 140.00
84/5 180.00
85/6 180.00
86/7 180. 00
S e l l i n g ' A r e a
P r i c e  *  '
t / t o r m e 000  h a
43.0£ £43
43. OS £49
43. OS £61
43. £4 £99
43. £4 £77
43. £4 £73
51.54 £4£.
51.54 £££
51.54 £30
57.07 SOS
63.89 191
89.00 . £18
137.00 £87
137.00 £6£
157.00 ££3
177.00 190
£££.00 £00
£££.00 £00
£££.00 110
* A grade
** Large scale commercial area
Sources Ministry of Agriculture, Agricultural Statistics 
A. M. A. , Grain Situation and Outlook Reports 
C.S.Q., Crop Production Forecasts
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Table 2 COTTON PRODUCTION AND PRICES
Browing Producer Average Average L. S. C. F SmallYear Price Dornest ic Export Area Farm
Price * Price * Area
cents/kg cents/kg cents/kg 000 ha 000 ha
68/9 15. 17 14. 97 15. 28 76 12-69/70 15. 17 15. 36 15. 87 55 2070/1 16. 34 15. 96 17.73 57 2971 /2 18.30 19.54 18. 58 59 4172/3 26.59 26. 13 21.90 69 4073/4 28. 00 33.51 32. 69 87 7874/5 26. 25 24.12 25.55 81 6975/6 35. 88 29.93 34. 64 58 4476/7 33. 00 34. 77 36.05 75 5077/8 33. 00 31.28 36. 80 86 5478/9 34. 00 35. 78 39. 68 77 3079/80 37. 50 38. 73 45.06 80 2480/1 40. 00 41.78 50.02 68 7281/2 51.50 41. 19 49. 51 56 6182/3 51. 50 41. 19 49.01 61 7783/4 57.00 45. 91 66. 13 75 11684/5 67. 00 55. 84 88. 80 75 15485/6 75. 00 58. 39 80. 06 54. 14986/7 80.00 57.65 65. 70 68 175
* Lint prices converted to seed cotton price eq u i va1ent (3554)
Sources Ministry of Agriculture, Agricultural Statistics 
A. M. A., Cotton Situation arid Outlook Reports
lable 3 SOYABEAN PRODUCTION PND PRICES
Growing
Year Producer Price * 
$/torine
Selling 
Price * 
♦/tonne
Area 
000 ha
68/9 83. 88 90. £0 669/70 83. 96 65. 60 1270/1 84. 34 58. 79 871/£ 73. 08 58. 52 672/3 81.81 91.43 873/4 109,01 123.57 - 1174/5 102.90 101.00 1875/6 102.90 101.00 2576/7 129.25 101.00 £477/8 140.25 121.75 3578/9 145.00 130.00 4079/80 160.00 168.00 4180/1 170.00 ; 168. 00 3181/2 200.00 168.00 4882/3 260.00 168.00 5583/4 287.00 314.00 5384/5 320.00 332.00 4285/6 340. 00 361.00 4086/7 385. 00 449.22 5587/8 420.00 60
* B grade
Sources Ministry of Agriculture, Agricultural Statistics
A.M.A., Oilseeds Situation and Outlook Reports C.S.0., Crop Production Forecasts
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Ia.ta.lJB. 4. WHEPT PRODUCTION PND PRICES
Growing
Year
Producer 
Price * 
$/tonne
Selling 
Price # 
$/tonne
Import 
Cost 
$/tonne
Prea 
000 ha
70 69. 45 79. 23 n. a. 14
71 69. 29 78.02 rt. A* 21
72 69.01 77. 75 48.00 22
73 69. 18 75. 49 70.00 21
74 79. 89 79.51 117.00 26
75 110.00 79.51 122.00 31
76 121.00 100.07 97. 00 33
77 123.00 113.36 - 42
78 110.00 113.36 - 45
79 115.00 120.67 - 34
80 135.00 134. 00 - 33
81 165.00 157.00 206.64 36
82 190.00 169.00 188.52 37
83 220.00 239. 00 279.44 22
84 250.00 285.00 296.92 17
85 285.00 323. 50 303. 33 34
86 300.00 358.25 378.17 42
87 330.00 358. 25 326.01 38
88 365.00 425.53 n. a. 48
* PS grade
Source* Ministry of Pgrlculture, Pgricultural Statistics 
P. M. R., 0. M. B. Pnnual Reports and Recounts 
P.M.P., Grain Situation and Outlook Reports
0. Mi B.
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Table 5 , BEEF CATTLE PRODUCTION AND PRICES
Market
Year i- Average . Producer .Price
; Average 
, Wholesale -Price
. Average Export 
F'rice
Herd Size*, 
mill!ons
■= Total Slaughter 
mill ions
70 35.76 33. 92 . 36 2. 44 0. 4271 36.76 33.97 44 ■ 2. 63 0. 517£ 40.38 34.97 ; • 47 2. 60 0. 6273 48.81 37.41 52 2. 43‘ - 0. 7274 ; 56.82 41.47 r,\ 62 2.43 0.5575 58.96 44.82 ,59 2. 631 0. 5276 57.00 47. 42 59 2. 76 0. 64
; 77 57.91 47. 66 ’ .54 2. 84 0. 7278 57.26 51.42 58- 2. 70 0. 73
79 _70.46 . 59. 39 : 72 2. 40 0. 6480 , 81.11 63.01 102- 2. 10 - 0. 5281 ■102.13 79. 28 183 2. 09 0. 4482 129,19 105.06 ■ o:196 2. 10 . 0.5283 130.42 122.55 •; 127 2. 06 ; 0. 53
84 , 147.98 149.82 . 146 1.92-.; 0.5285 153,30 159.42 197 1.76 0. 4786 179.83 172. 78 622 .1.80 0. 39:87 223.95 ■; 198. 12 606« 1.66 0. 44
* commercial herd - . . "
Sources Ministry of Agricult u>"e» Agricultural Statistics. A. M. A., „ Bpef Situation and -Outlook ReportsA. M. A. * . C. S. C. ’.Annual Reports and Accounts'
40
Table g, INDEX OF MAIZE PRICES AND SOME MAJOR INPUT COSTS
Growing
Year
Producer
Price
Fert i1iser 
Index
Labour
Index
T ractor 
Price
69/70 100. 0 100. 0 100 10070/1 87. 6 100.0 102 10271 /S 75.6 100.0 105 1057£/3 101.4 100.0 117 11073/4 100. 4 100. 0 1££ 11674/5 106. 3 117. 4 1£7 11375/6 1£0. 9 £01.5 130 19676/7 13£. 0 184.0 150 19677/8 13£. 7 £04.7 155 £3778/9 154. 5 £19.6 178 £4579/80 £17.1 ££4. 1 £63 3££r80/1 306. 4 £66. 1 380 38881/S 306. 4 £96. £ 535 5£08£/3 306.4 3£7. £ 575 73083/4 357. 5 3£7.£ 645 8£784/5 459. 6 484. 8 755 88785/6 459. 6 64£. 4 877 l'£7586/7 459. 6 ' 64£. 4 997 1£8£87/8 498. 0 642. 4 1165 1313
1969/70 - 100
Source® Ministry of Agriculture, Agricultural Statistic®
Ministry of Agriculture* 11th Annual Report of Farm - Management Data
A.M.A.| Grain Situation and Outlook Reports C. F. U. , Price Lists
&
41
Table Z PRICE SUPPORT,INPUT SUBSIDIES, & DROUGHT RELIEF
ft. >
Fiscal Maize Wheat Oil- Tobacco Cotton Beef Dairy Inputs Drought 
Year seed / Subsidy Relief
Payment
* million
G5/G 0. 4 0. 1 0. 3
66/7 * 0. 8 0.7
67/8 2.9 0. 1 14. 0 5. 968/9 , 0. 2 * 10. 0
69/70 Q ■ 0. 3 0. 2 9. 0 1.6 1.9
70/1 0 . 1 0. 2 16. 0 1.4
71/2 # 0.2 19.0 0. 8 *
72/3 0. 2 20. 0 2.2 0. 1
73/4 14.7 4. 4 10. 1
74/5 8. 5 10.3 0.2
75/6 8. 3
76/7 in■o 11.7 6.3
77/8 6. 9 11.3 1.9
78/9 12. 8 0.8 1.5 5. 0 20.5 3.7
79/80 4.3 1.4 1.4 12. 9 2. 1 6. 8
80/1 9.7 1.9 9.6 4. 1 5. 6
1981/2 - 1987/8 Breakdown not available. 
* less than $50000
Source i Ministry of Agriculture, Agricultural Statistic®
B.) Agricultural Commodity Trading Deficits/(Surpluses)
Market
Year
ending
in
Maize Wheat Soyabeans Groundnuts Cotton Beef Dairy
m % 1 11 On ""
1982 20.4 9.3 2. 1 0. 5 <0. 9) 46. 4 18. 4
1983 43. 6 12. 1 5.7 0. 6 17. 8 45. 3 35. 6
1984 17.0 10.2 3. 6 (0.2) <4. 3) 48. 1 38. 6
1985 42.6 4. 4 <0.5) 0.2 <56. 8) 33. 4 46. 3
1986 46.3 5. 8 1.4 0. 4 14. 3 28. 7 55. 6
1987 57. 3 14. 3 <0. 2) 0. 6 53. 9 37. 2
1988 
< ) “
58. 5 
surplus
2.9 <0. 3) 0. 8 35.4 n/a n/a
Source i Annual Reports and Accounts of the four 
Parastatals
Marketing
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Chart 1. MAIZE
Commercial Area Planted and Prices
GROWING SEASON
------Producer Price , Selling Price —“►-Area
Data from Table 1
Chart 2. COTTON 
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Data irom Table 2
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Data from Table 9
Chart 4. WHEAT
Commercial Area Planted and Prices
$ / TONNE *000  H«
—— Produoer Prloe — Selling Prloe
Area Cost of Imports
Date from Table 4
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Data from Table 6
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